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Introduction 
The real problem with speeding is that it is socially acceptable.  Most drivers 
speed but are rarely involved in crashes.  Police tolerance to marginal speed 
limit infringements is assumed, the likelihood of detection is perceived as low 
and fixed penalties are not considered particularly severe. High performance 
vehicles with speed capabilities well in excess of maximum national speed 
limits are not illegal but rather are considered a symbol of personal success.  
The result is that speeding is not perceived as dangerous, criminal or immoral 
but rather is considered the norm.  Attempts to enforce speed limits tend to be 
unpopular, being viewed more as an infringement of personal liberty than as a 
curb on anti-social and potentially lethal behaviour.  
 
The evidence for the safety benefits of reduced speed is, however, strong.  
Certainly the basic laws of physics suggest that lower speeds will reduce both 
accident frequency and severity: lower speeds reduce both stopping distances 
and the energy dissipated in a crash.  Available evidence does indeed confirm 
that both accident frequency and severity fall with reduced speeds (see, for 
example, McCarthy (2001), Stuster et al. (1998) and Taylor et al. (2000)).   
What is less clear is how best to ensure that drivers maintain safe speeds.  
While a wide range of approaches has been tried, speed enforcement 
cameras have undoubtedly attracted most public attention, frequently making 
headline news as, for example, happened recently following the publication of 
an evaluation of the UK national safety camera programme (Gains et al. 2004)  
 
Certainly for those responsible for road safety, speed enforcement cameras 
are seen as a way of increasing the perceived risk of prosecution for speeding 
and hence raising drivers awareness of the dangers, and the unacceptability, 
of excessive speed.  However, although the rapid proliferation of cameras in 
recent years has undoubtedly increased the perceived risk of prosecution it 
has not fundamentally changed attitudes to the consequences of excessive 
speed.  Critics have suggested that the primary objective of cameras is to 
raise money rather than to improve road safety and there have been claims 
that they may actually cost lives.  While most of the criticisms of speed 
cameras are spurious (PACTS 2003, Mylius 2004), arising from a social 
climate that continues to consider the speed and the personal liberty afforded 
by cars desirable, the use of speed cameras continues to be controversial. 
   
In the UK the Road Traffic Act 1991 first authorised the use of automatic 
speed devices for the detection of offences but it was following the 
introduction of the cost recovery system for cameras (introduced on a pilot 
basis in eight counties in 2000 and extended nationally in 2001) that the most 
rapid increase in deployment occurred.  There are now some 5000 locations 
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in the UK where speeds are enforced by fixed or mobile cameras.  In 2001, in 
attempt to refute claims that cameras were simply money-raising devices, the 
government controversially announced that speed cameras should be made 
more easily visible to motorists by, amongst other things, requiring camera 
housings to be yellow (DfT 2001).  This was, however, criticised by many 
experts as a signal to drivers that it was only necessary to observe the speed 
limit at the cameras.  The recently published evaluation of the effects of 
cameras in the UK reports that, at sites where safety cameras are in use, the 
number of people killed and seriously injured has fallen by 40%, with a 33% 
reduction in injury accidents (Gains et al. 2004).  However, while the balance 
of evidence is certainly that cameras do reduce accidents, the evidence for 
the likely size of their effect is still by no means incontrovertible.   
 
The fundamental problem with the evaluation of any road safety scheme is 
that before-and-after observations of changes in accident frequencies will 
include, not only changes due to the impact of the safety scheme, but also 
changes which would have occurred in any case: changes arising due to 
general trends in accidents and regression-to-mean (RTM) effects (see, for 
example, Hirst et al. 2004a).  If these are ignored the effect of treatment will 
normally be over-estimated since, for most schemes, the effect of both trend 
and RTM effects will be a reduction in accidents in a subsequent time period 
even without the scheme.  In the case of trend, for example, there has been a 
general downward trend in total personal injury accidents (PIAs) and in fatal 
and serious accidents (FSAs) for many years in the UK (Figure 1).  Downward 
RTM effects arise when sites are selected on the basis of high accident 
frequencies.  The selection criteria for the location of cameras normally 
include a poor accident history and, indeed the current guidelines for new 
sites in the UK include specific accident thresholds: 8 PIAs per km and at 
least 4 FSAs per km in the last three years.  A further difficulty arises in that 
methods to correct for RTM effects normally rely on the use of accident 
prediction models to predict expected accident frequencies given the type of 
site and volume of traffic.  The general downward trend in accident risk means 
that such models will tend to become outdated.  Over time such models will 
increasingly overestimate expected accidents so that estimated treatment 
effects may still be exaggerated unless an appropriate correction is applied 
(Hirst et al. 2004b).  
 
With cameras there is also a real possibility that an “accident migration” effect 
may arise, with increases in accidents either on nearby roads or on the same 
road as the camera, upstream or downstream of it.  The mechanisms by 
which such effects could arise are of two types.  First, drivers may attempt to 
find an alternative route so as to avoid the route with the camera and as a 
consequence some of the beneficial effects of the camera may be eroded by 
increases in accidents on diversionary routes.  If changes in route choice 
occur then it is also important to be aware that any accident reduction 
observed in the section where speed limits are enforced by the camera will 
include both the effects of a decrease in accident risk (due to reduced speeds 
or other changes in driver behaviour) and the effects of reduced traffic flow: 
ignoring any reduction in flow will lead to over-estimates of the benefits of 
reduced speeds.  The second possible mechanism through which a migration 
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effect may be induced is through drivers braking abruptly on their approach to 
the camera so as to avoid detection or rapidly accelerating after passing it so 
as to avoid an increase in travel time.  This behaviour could potentially result 
in an increase in accidents upstream or downstream of the camera.   The 
possibility of either form of accident migration suggests that the effects of 
changes in flow and changes in speed should be separately assessed and 
that accident frequencies in a range of distance bands from the camera 
should be considered. 
 
No previous study has attempted to fully deal with all of these issues.  The 
first published study of the safety effects of speed enforcement cameras to 
take account of both RTM and trend effects (Elvik 1997) is based on data for 
64 cameras in Norway: a statistically significant reduction of 20% in the 
number of personal injury accidents (PIAs) was found.  Although the 
possibility of an accident migration effect was noted there were insufficient 
data available to establish whether such an effect occurred.   More recently a 
study based on data for 42 speed cameras in one UK county 
(Cambridgeshire) found, after allowing for trend and regression-to-mean 
effects, that the average effect of cameras was a 31% reduction in PIAs (Hess 
& Polak 2003).  A subsequent study based on 49 cameras in Cambridgeshire 
studied accidents within various distance bands: the reduction in PIAs in the 
immediate vicinity of the camera (250m radius) was estimated to be 46% 
while over a 2km radius there was an estimated reduction of 21% (Hess 
2003).  While these results suggest that cameras can actually reduce 
accidents over a wide area, in the absence of flow data it was not possible to 
assess the extent to which changes in route choice could have been 
responsible for this reduction and whether any compensating increases may 
have occurred on diversionary routes. 
 
The 2-year evaluation of the UK national safety programme, reported the 
effects of some 600 speed and red-light cameras in 8 regions of the UK 
(Gains et al. 2003).  This study reported a 6% reduction in PIAs and a 35% 
reduction in people killed or seriously injured (KSI) compared to long-term 
trends.  In this study, although trend effects were allowed for, the authors 
noted that insufficient data were available to check fully for RTM effects.  No 
flow data were available but area wide comparisons were used to check for 
migration effects: it was concluded that there was “no gross accident 
migration effect”.  More recently the 3-year evaluation has been published 
(Gains et al. 2004).  Based on data for 24 regions, this study reports overall 
reductions of 33% in PIAs and 40% reductions in KSIs relative to long-term 
trends but no corrections for RTM or migration were applied.  
 
Available studies of speed cameras are then open to the criticism that not all 
of the reported accident reductions can necessarily be directly attributed to the 
effects of the cameras on vehicle speeds and that there may be compensating 
increases in accidents elsewhere on the road network. The aim of this study 
was to separately assess the effect of speed cameras on accidents arising 
due to their impact on both speed and flow, at various distances from the 
camera, free of both RTM and trend effects.  The objective was to establish: 
the magnitude of the accident reduction due to any speed reduction at the 
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camera; whether the effect on speeds upstream and downstream of the 
camera results in an increase or decrease accidents; whether cameras result 
in a sufficient diversion of traffic to other routes to induce a significant impact 
on accidents.   
 
Data 
The data for this study relate to 62 fixed speed enforcement cameras at 
various locations throughout the UK.  All of the cameras were on roads with 
30mph speed limits where speeding problems are severe: in 2003 some 58% 
of cars and 54% of motorcycles were estimated to have exceeded the 30mph 
limit on UK roads (DfT 2004)).   
 
Various local authorities and police forces supplied the required data. This 
comprised details of all accidents occurring at the camera schemes during the 
3 years prior to implementation and for up to 3 years after implementation (an 
average after period of 2.3 years) together with various measures of before 
and after speeds.  At least one measurement of traffic flow was also obtained 
during the periods both before and after the start of camera enforcement.  The 
sample size was limited by the availability of sufficiently detailed data on 
accidents, speeds and flows.  Supplementary information (to permit the use of 
predictive models to correct for RTM effects) included road class, the number 
of junctions, and the method of junction control. 
 
There is currently no standard accident monitoring length for speed 
enforcement cameras in the UK and an appropriate monitoring length has 
been largely a matter of judgement.  Ideally the aim would be to include the 
full length of road where accident frequencies are affected by the presence of 
the camera, while excluding sections beyond the area of influence of the 
camera: a monitoring length which is too short will fail to establish the full 
effect of the scheme in terms of the number of accidents saved; a monitoring 
length which is too long will suffer from the masking effect of accidents which 
are unaffected by the presence of the camera (resulting in an under-estimate 
of the percentage accident reduction).   While 500m either side of the camera 
is most common in the UK, other lengths are also used including, for example, 
100m upstream and 400m downstream of the camera and between the first 
major junctions upstream and downstream.  In this study, with a view to 
assessing the true area of influence of the camera (including any evidence for 
any migration effect arising due to sudden braking or rapid acceleration) 
accident data were requested for a section of 2km centred on the camera.  
These data were not available for every site and the data used thus includes 
all available recorded accidents up to 1km either side of the camera, a total of 
almost 2000 accidents.    
 
Analysis 
The approach to the accident analysis is described in detail elsewhere (Hirst 
et al 2004a and 2004b) and will only be briefly summarised here.  To control 
for RTM effects, the expected accidents in the before period were estimated 
using an Empirical Bayes (EB) approach.  In this the underlying mean 
accident frequency is estimated as a weighted average of two sources of 
information: the observed accidents in the period before treatment, XB, and a 
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predictive model estimate of expected accidents given the nature of the site 
and the level of traffic flow (see, for example, Hauer 1997).  In this study the 
predictive models derived by Mountain et al. (1997) were used.  The 
parameters of this model depend on the road class, speed limit and 
carriageway type.  For example, for a 30mph, single carriageway, A-road the 
model for annual PIAs is:      
 
) / 08 . 0 exp( 9 . 0 ˆ
6 . 0 L n L qB = μ  
 
where  μ ˆ  is the predicted annual PIAs, qB is the annual flow in the before 
period (in million vehicles per year), L is the section length (km) and n is the 
number of minor intersections.   
 
The estimate of total before accidents in a before period of  years is then   B t
 
B μ ˆ  =  μ ˆ . B t  
 
As the predictive model was derived from data for the 12-year period 1980 to 
1991 a correction was applied to allow for the fact that the model will be 
outdated due to trends in accident risk between the modelled period and the 
period of observation at the cameras (Hirst et al 2004b).  The corrected 
estimated is given by 
 
  B CORRECTED   B ˆ ˆ μ γ μ
t =   
 
where  γ is the average factor by which risk changes from year to year 
(estimated to be 0.98) and t is the elapsed time between the middle of the 
modelling and study periods.  Thus, for example, for a camera that became 
operational in January 2001 (with a before period from January 1998 to 
December 2000) t = 13.5 and thus  = 0.76. 
t γ
 
Normally predictive accident models assume that the random errors are from 
the negative binomial (NB) family.  If K is the shape parameter for the NB 
distribution (K=1.9 for above model), the EB estimate of total accidents in the 
before period,  , is calculated as  B M ˆ
 
() B B B X M α μ α − + = 1 ˆ ˆ
CORRECTED  
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1
−
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
+ =
K
CORRECTED B μ
α  
 
To allow for the trend in accidents between the before and after periods, the 
expected accidents in the after period were estimated using a comparison 
group approach.  The comparison group for this study comprised UK national 
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accident totals during the relevant before and after period for each scheme.  
The estimate of after accidents allowing for trend,  , is then  A M ˆ
 
B
NAT B
NAT A
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⎛
=  
 
where AB_NAT = total national accidents in the before period, tB years 
AA_NAT = total national accidents in the after period, tA years 
  
The use of a comparison group ratio implicitly assumes that flows at the study 
site have changed in line with national trends.  To take account of the effects 
of any flow changes due to camera installation, while avoiding double 
counting, it is necessary to have a representative measure of traffic flow at the 
scheme in the after period, qA, together with flow data for the comparison 
group.  If 
 
QB_NAT = total national flow in the before period 
QA_NAT = total national flow in the after period 
 
then the expected flow in the after period if flows at the study site had 
changed in line with general trends, A q′ , can be estimated using 
 
B
B NAT B
A NAT A
A q
t Q
t Q
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_
_  
 
If the observed flow in after period,  , differs from  A q A q′  then there have been 
local changes in flow at the site other than those attributable to trend.  The 
estimate of expected after accidents allowing for local changes in flow,  , 
can then be estimated as 
A M′ ˆ
 
β
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
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⎝
⎛
′
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A
A
A A q
q
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It would be a matter of local knowledge to assess whether these changes 
were as a result of the camera or due to other causes.  In this study there 
were no cameras where a change in flow due to other causes was 
anticipated: all local changes in flow were attributed to the impact of the 
camera.  The change in accidents attributable to the impact of a camera on 
flow,  , was thus estimated as   F S
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F
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and the change attributable to the effect of the camera on traffic speed (and 
possibly other aspects of driver behaviour),  , was   R S
B
B
A
A
A
A
R
t
X
t
M
t
X
S
ˆ
ˆ
′ −
=  
 
The overall scheme effect,  , is then estimated as  .  S F R S S S ˆ ˆ ˆ + =
 
The non-scheme effects (i.e. the changes which would have occurred with or 
without speed enforcement cameras) are the changes due to national 
accident trends over the before and after periods,  , and RTM effects, N T N R.  
These are estimated as   
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The observed proportional change in observed accidents, B, which can be 
written  
 
B
B
B
B
A
A
t
X
t
X
t
X
B
−
=  
 
is thus made up of four elements, each of which was estimated separately 
 
R T F R N N S S B ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + =  
 
Impact on speeds 
Table 1 summarises various measures of speed prior to camera enforcement 
and the changes in speed following implementation.  The mean speed at the 
sites prior to the cameras was 33mph, with 64% of vehicles exceeding the 
speed limit.  This is marginally higher than the UK national average for cars on 
30 mph roads (a mean speed of 31mph with 59% exceeding the speed limit 
(DTp 2004)).  Following the introduction of cameras, all measures of speed 
fell:  mean speeds by an average of 4.4mph and 85
th percentile speeds by 
5.9mph.  There was also a 35% reduction in the percentage exceeding the 
speed limit.  These changes are not dissimilar from those observed in the 
recent national study (Gains et al. 2004) although a direct comparison cannot 
be made because the changes for fixed cameras on 30mph roads are not 
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reported separately.  For all types of cameras on 30mph roads the reported 
fall in mean speed was 2.4mph with a 33% reduction in vehicles exceeding 
the speed limit; for fixed cameras on urban roads (30 and 40mph limits) the 
corresponding falls were 5.3mph and 71%.    
  
Impact on accidents 
Table 2 summarises the total observed accidents, together with the observed 
and estimated percentage changes in these accidents for the 62 camera 
schemes.  For all PIAs the data are presented both for 3 separate distance 
bands (up to 250m, 250-500m and 500-1000m from the camera) as well as 
for 3 cumulative distance bands (up to 500m, up to 1km and between major 
intersections).  As there are a relatively small number of fatal and serious 
accidents (FSAs), only data for the 3 cumulative distance bands are given. 
 
The “headline” data are given column 5.  Here the observed average accident 
reduction over the normal monitoring length of 500m is a 26% fall in overall 
injury accidents with a 34% fall in fatal and serious accidents.  For a more 
direct comparison with Gains et al. (2004) an adjustment for trend is required.  
This is given by the difference between columns 5 and 9 (B -  ).  The 
headline figure after allowing for trend then becomes a 30% reduction in all 
PIAs with a 29% reduction in fatal and serious accidents.   
T N ˆ
 
Columns 6 to 8 give the estimates of the safety effects of the cameras due to 
their impact on speeds and flow.  For the 500m monitoring length, the overall 
average effect of cameras on accidents is a reduction of 25%, similar to the 
observed reduction.  This is made up of a reduction of 20% attributable to the 
impact of the cameras on speed (and possibly other aspects of driver 
behaviour), with a 5% reduction attributable to a diversion of traffic to other 
routes (where there is a possibility of an increase in accidents).  The effect on 
fatal and serious accidents is an overall average reduction of 11%: only one 
third of the observed reduction and, with a 95% confidence interval of –26% to 
+9%, this reduction is not statistically significant.  The overall effect of the 
cameras on fatal and serious accidents includes a fall of 5% attributable to 
diversion of traffic to other routes, with a fall of only 6% attributable to the 
impact of the cameras on speed: again inspection of the confidence interval 
indicates that this is not significant. 
 
A possible explanation of the somewhat disappointing effect on fatal and 
serious accidents as compared with other studies might be that the sites 
included in this study had comparatively few serious accidents prior to camera 
installation.  Inspection of column 3 (Table 1) confirms that the schemes do 
not generally meet the current UK guidelines for new static camera sites.   
Over the 1km section centered on the camera, there were, on average, 15.9 
observed PIAs/km in the 3 years before camera installation, of which 2.7 
accidents/km (17%) were fatal or serious.  Thus while the study sites had, on 
average, almost twice as many total accidents as are required by the current 
criteria, they would fail to meet the current criterion for FSAs.  However, in 
spite of this, at 17%, the proportion of fatal and serious accidents at these 
sites is rather higher than the national average of 13% for 30mph roads (DfT 
2003a) and the estimated RTM effect (an average reduction of 18% for a 
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500m monitoring length) suggests that these sites had considerably more fatal 
and serious accidents than expected given their site characteristics and traffic 
volume.  Camera sites selected on the basis of an even higher frequency of 
FSAs may have site characteristics which give rise to higher expected 
frequencies (for example, higher traffic volumes) so that RTM effects will not 
necessarily be any larger than those observed in this study.  Never-the-less it 
is clearly important to establish the size of the effect since, if not fully 
accounted for, RTM could explain much of any observed accident reduction. 
 
The data for PIAs in the 3 separate distance bands suggests that the accident 
reduction tends to be largest and most consistent in the region up to 250m 
from the camera but on average accidents are reduced in all 3 regions.  There 
is then no evidence of a migration effect upstream or downstream of the 
cameras due to sudden changes in speed on approaching or passing the 
camera.  When the data are combined into the cumulative distance bands,  
the average reduction in PIAs attributable to speed effects (column 7) is of the 
order of 20% for all distance bands.  Thus, in terms of the percentage 
accident reduction attributable to the cameras, there is little to choose 
between monitoring lengths of 1km either side of the camera and the more 
commonly used 500m either side of the camera or indeed “between major 
junctions”.    
 
The estimates of the impact of flow changes at the cameras (column 8) 
suggest that cameras do, on average, result in a significant diversion of traffic 
to other routes: there is an average accident reduction of around 5% 
attributable to the effects of the cameras on traffic flow which, although small, 
is statistically significant.  This would suggest that, for camera sites where 
alternative routes are available, as a minimum flows before and after camera 
installation should be checked to assess the extent of any changes in route 
choice.  Ideally, if changes in flow do occur, accidents on likely diversionary 
routes should be monitored to assess whether any compensating increases 
have occurred on them. 
 
The estimates of the non-scheme effects (trend and RTM) are given in 
columns 9 and 10.  RTM effects result in a significant reduction in both PIAs 
and FSAs in all distance bands.  While the effect on PIAs is comparatively 
small, for FSAs the change attributable to RTM represents over half of the 
observed accident reduction.  The estimates of trend effects are rather 
variable, and while there is an average fall in FSAs due to trend, there is an 
average increase in PIAs.  This is a consequence of the range of 
implementation dates for the cameras included in this study.  Figure 1 shows 
the national trends in accidents.  While the underlying trend is downwards and 
FSAs decline fairly consistently year-on-year, total PIAs tend to fluctuate with 
several year-on-year increases.  Thus for PIAs, depending on the 
implementation date, the effects of trend between the periods before and after 
implementation, can be up or down.   For the range of implementation dates 
for these sites (generally the mid-1990s) the average trend effect was 
upwards.   
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Although it is common to consider accident reductions in percentage terms it 
is also of interest to consider the size of the absolute accident reduction 
achieved.   The benefits in social and human costs as well in cost-benefit 
terms will be greater with a 50% reduction in accidents at a site with 20 
accidents than a 100% reduction at a site with only 5 accidents.  Current 
estimates suggest that the average value of preventing an injury accident on a 
30mph road is approximately £45,000, with the figure rising to over £1million 
for a fatal accident (DfT, 2003b).     
 
In Table 3 the scheme effects (corrected for trend and RTM) are given in 
terms of the annual accident reduction per kilometer.  Although the average 
annual reduction is slightly smaller for the longer monitoring length, doubling 
the monitored length (by using 1km either side of the camera rather than 
500m) does mean that the overall accident reduction is larger: with a 500m 
section the total accident saving attributable to speed changes over 3 years 
would be on average 3 accidents as compared with around 5.5 for a 1km 
section.   Clearly the annual average reduction in fatal and serious accidents 
is very small but potentially important in both social and cost-benefit terms. 
 
Discussion 
Fixed speed cameras on 30mph roads were found to reduce mean speeds by 
an average of 4.4mph and the percentage exceeding the speed limit by 35%.  
The effects of the cameras on traffic speeds resulted in a reduction in 
accidents up to 1km upstream and downstream of the cameras.  Over this 
distance, the average effect of the cameras was a fall in PIAs of some 25%, of 
which a fall of 20% was attributable to their impact on speed.  In absolute 
terms this is an average reduction of 1 PIA/km/year.  Although the safety 
benefits of fixed cameras decline with distance from the camera, monitoring 
over a length of 1km upstream and downstream of the camera has the 
advantage that all of the accident savings achieved are included.  The 
reduction in both percentage terms and in terms of accidents per unit length 
are similar to those based on a monitoring length of 500m: there is no 
evidence of any masking effect due to the inclusion of sections where the 
cameras have had little or no influence.  It is possible that the beneficial 
effects of fixed cameras extend beyond 1km in either direction but this could 
not be established from the data available for this study.   
  
The impact of cameras on fatal and serious accidents was rather less certain.  
While reductions of the order of one third were observed, more than half of 
this was attributable to RTM effects, and the fall in fatal and serious accidents 
attributable to the cameras was not significantly different from zero.  Given the 
relatively low frequency of fatal and serious accidents at these sites the 
results are perhaps not surprising.  It does, however, highlight the danger of 
placing too much emphasis on observed numbers of fatal and serious 
accidents.  If cameras are targeted at sites with large numbers of such 
accidents they may achieve a substantial reduction in observed accidents in a 
subsequent period simply because of RTM effects.  Equally some recent 
press reports (for example, Clark 2004) have highlighted as the “worst” 
camera sites, locations where more fatal and serious accidents were 
observed in the after period than in the before period.  This is not evidence 
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that these cameras have failed or are “costing lives”: such observations can 
arise simply as a result of a “reverse RTM effect” due to an unexpectedly 
small number of observed accidents for a particular site during the before 
period.  It simply highlights the need to control for RTM effects and the need 
to bear in mind that, since data is not always readily available to fully control 
for RTM, the results of observational studies must be treated with caution.  
While the targeting of clearly visible cameras at serious accident “blackspots” 
may appease some motorists (making it difficult for them to argue that the 
camera is designed to raise revenue) such targeting should not be to the 
exclusion of sites which have large numbers of less serious speed related 
accidents that could also benefit from increased speed enforcement (and 
which could prevent a fatal accident before it happens).         
   
There is no evidence that the effects of any sudden braking on the approach 
to a fixed camera or any rapid acceleration after passing it have any 
detrimental effect on safety.   However, the impact of cameras on route choice 
does have a small but significant impact on accidents on the routes with 
cameras: the diversion of traffic away from routes with cameras results in a 
5% fall in PIAs at the cameras. It is thus possible that there is an increase in 
accidents on the diversionary routes.  This suggests that traffic flows at speed 
cameras should be routinely monitored along with speeds and accidents and, 
where changes in route choice are detected, consideration should be given to 
monitoring accidents on the alternative routes used. 
 
Conclusions 
The main obstacles to achieving the road safety benefits possible from further 
deployment of speed enforcement cameras seem to be public opposition and 
a consequent lack of political will.  Speed enforcement cameras on 30mph 
roads have been shown to offer safety improvements over a distance of up to 
1km upstream and downstream of the camera, with reductions in accidents 
over this distance averaging 20% or 1 PIA/km/year attributable to reductions 
in speed.  To realise the full potential safety benefits of cameras what is 
needed is wider deployment and less emphasis on fatal and serious accidents 
in selecting locations for new cameras.  This may require a shift in public 
attitudes to speeding and its consequences: an acceptance that speeding, like 
drinking-and-driving or smoking in public places, endangers the quality of life 
of both the individual and others and, as a consequence, is socially 
unacceptable. 
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Figure 1: National trends in accidents 1980-2002 
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Table 1: Summary of observed speeds 
 
Speed measurement 
 
Number of 
sites* 
 
Mean before 
scheme 
 
(s.e) {95% C.I.} 
 
 
Mean change 
 
(s.e.) {95% C.I.} 
Mean (mph)  57  32.8 
(0.56) {31.7, 34.0} 
 
-4.4 
(0.37){-5.2, -3.7} 
 
85
th percentile (mph)  61  38.9 
(0.55) {37.8, 39.9} 
 
-5.9 
(0.45) {-6.8, -5.0} 
 
Standard deviation (mph)  50  6.3 
(0.18) {5.9, 6.6} 
 
-1.2 
(0.22) {-1.6, -0.7} 
 
% exceeding speed limit  61  64.3 
(2.48) {59.4, 69.3} 
 
-35.2 
(2.57) {-40.3, -30} 
 
Mean speed of speeders 
(mph) 
45 36.9 
(0.42) {36.0, 37.7} 
 
-1.4 
(0.26) {-1.9, -0.8} 
* Not all sites have data for all measures of speed 
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Table 2:  Impact of cameras on accidents. 
 
Accident change attributable to scheme 
effects 
 
% change 
(s.e.){95%CI} 
 
 
Accident change attributable to 
non-scheme effects 
 
% change 
(s.e.){95%CI} 
 
Accident 
type 
 
Distance 
from camera* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.of 
sites
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total observed 
accidents 
 
 
[accs/km/year in 
before period] 
 
 
 
Observed 
change in 
accidents 
 
% change 
(s.e.){95%CI} 
 
 
 
Overall 
scheme 
effect  
 
Change in 
speed 
 
 
Change in 
flow 
 
Trend in 
accidents 
 
RTM 
 
      B   S ˆ   R S ˆ   F S ˆ   T N ˆ   R N ˆ  
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Up to 250M  62  757  [5.6]  -34% 
(7) {-47, -19} 
-25% 
(6) {-36, -13} 
-20% 
(6) {-31, -7} 
-5% 
(3) {-10, 0} 
0% 
(3) {-6, 6} 
-9% 
(2) {-12, -6} 
250 to 500M  55  548  [4.7]  -15% 
(9) {-30, 4} 
-15% 
(8) {-28, 2} 
-10% 
(8) {–24, 5} 
-5% 
(1) {-8, -2} 
+8% 
(3) {2, 14} 
-8% 
(3) {-13, -1} 
500M to 1KM  40  616 [4.2]  -13%  
(10) {-32, 7} 
-12% 
(9) {-28, 6} 
-9%  
(9) {-27, 10} 
-4%  
(1) {-6, -1} 
+3%  
(4) {-3, 9} 
-4%  
(2) {-7, -1} 
Up to 500M  62  1305  [5.3]  -26%  
(6) {-36, -13} 
-25% 
(5) {-35, -14} 
-19%  
(6) {-30, -8} 
-5%  
(2) {-10, -1} 
+4%  
(3) {-1, 9} 
-5%  
(1) {-7, -3} 
Up to 1KM  62  1921  [4.9]  -18%  
(6) {-30, -6} 
-24%  
(5) {-33, -13} 
-19%  
(6) {-28, -6} 
-5%  
(2) {-8, -2} 
+8%  
(3) {+3, +14} 
-4%  
(1) {-5, -2} 
 
All PIAs 
Between 
majors 
62  1809  [4.9]  -18% 
(6) {-30, -6} 
-22%  
(5) {-33, -12} 
-17% 
(6) {-28, -5} 
-5% 
(2) {-8,-2} 
+8%  
(2) {+4, +13} 
-4%  
(1) {-5, -2} 
Up to 500M  62  211  [0.89]  -34%  
(10) {-51, -11} 
-11% 
(9) {-26,9} 
-6%  
(9) {-21, 12} 
-5%  
(2) {-8, -2} 
-5%  
(2) {-10, -1} 
-18%  
(5) {-25, -9} 
Up to 1KM  62  317  [0.85]  -28%  
(10) {-44, -8} 
-13%  
(8) {-28, 5} 
-9%  
(8) {-28, 9} 
-4%  
(1) {-7, -2} 
-1% 
(2) {-5, 4} 
-15% 
(4) {-21, -6} 
 
Fatal & 
serious 
accidents 
Between 
majors 
62  297  [0.84]  -27%  
(10) {-44, -6} 
-11%  
(8) {-26, 6} 
-7%  
(9) {-23, 11} 
-4%  
(1) {-7, -2} 
-1% 
(2) {-5, 3} 
-15% 
(4) {-22, -7} 
*Location of accidents relative to camera (both upstream and downstream) 
**Not all sites have accident data for 
(s.e.) = standard error of the estimate, {95%CI} = 95% confidence interval of the estimate  
 
 
Table 3: Summarised estimates of absolute accident changes  
 
Accident change attributable to 
scheme effects: 
 
accs/km/yr  
(s.e.){95%CI} 
 
Accident 
type 
 
 
 
Distance from 
camera* 
 
 
 
Observed change 
in accidents  
 
accs/km/yr  
(s.e.){95%CI} 
 
Change in speed 
 
Change in flow 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Up to 500M  -1.36  
(0.35) {-2.08, -0.68} 
-1.02 
(0.31) {-1.58, -0.36} 
-0.28 
(0.12) {-0.51, -0.02} 
 
All PIAs 
Up to 1KM  -0.91  
(0.30) {-1.47, -0.29} 
-0.91 
(0.29) {-1.44, -0.31} 
-0.25 
(0.09) {-0.44, -0.07} 
Up to 500M  -0.31 
(0.10) {-0.51, -0.11} 
-0.11 
(0.09) {-0.26, 0.07} 
-0.02 
(0.01) {-0.05, 0} 
 
Fatal and 
serious 
accidents  Up to 1KM  -0.24 
(0.10) {-0.44, -0.05} 
-0.13 
(0.07) {-0.27, 0.01} 
-0.02 
(0.01) {-0.04, 0} 
*Location of accidents relative to camera (both upstream and downstream) 
(s.e.) = standard error of the estimate, {95%CI} = 95% confidence interval of the estimate 
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